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Abstract
With respect to the climate change, and more generally to the energy problem, in
the laboratories working on the subject, scientists contribute to clarify the situation
and to help decision makers by yielding and updating factual physical informations,
and also by modelling. This conceptual work is mainly done in the language of
economics. This discipline, which appears therefore in the core of the reecting
process in action at present, is however rather peculiar is the sense that it uses
mathematics in order to think social phenomena.
It is on this methodological conguration that we hold a philosophical enquiry.
Our analysis focuses on risks, incertitude and on the role of mathematics to represent
them. It concludes on the importance of a certain type of modelization, investigation
modelling, which reveals new signications.
This study attempts to enlighten some part of the limit between mathematized
knowledge, as economics, and interpretative meaning used in every day life and
social and human sciences
Keywords : risk, tails of probability distribution, nance, interpretation, VaR, modelling
I. The question of the tails of probability distributions.
The probability distributions are badly known in the region where the probability
is low, in particular in the neighborhood of innity. Although well known today, the
awareness of this important question has been progressive during the history of sciences
and explains some present diculties.
First of all, it has been remarked that asymptotically thick distributions possess
strange unusual properties. The discovery of the fact that the law dx
(x2+1) (today called
Cauchy law) has no expectation and has the stable property, hence doesn't fullled the
central limit theorem, goes back to Sim eon Denis Poisson around 1830, twenty years be-
fore Cauchy. Henri Poincar e in his probability course at the Sorbonne at the close end of









































9the nineteenth century notes that this type of distribution contradicts the least squares
method. Nevertheless during the twentieth century, with the development of mathemat-
ical economics, operational research and decision theory, the quadratic mean reasonings
expand in a whole general rationality.
It may be sketched in the following manner: if, for a decision in uncertainty, you choose
the value of a parameter so that the mean of the squares of the discrepancies between
this quantity and the chosen value be minimal, then this kind of choice is compatible
with other subsequent choices taken with the same method and with possible sub-choices
done along the same principle. It is what mechanicists know when a solid body is shared
into several parts, the gravity center of the gravity centers of the parts weighted with
the masses of the parts, is still the gravity center of the whole body. This rationality
impregnate economical reasonings of optimal decision as soon as they involve the notion
of expectation or of conditional expectation which carry in themselves the idea of mean
quadratic minimization.
A remark must be done here that the use of utility functions in order to escape from
the concept of mathematical expectation, although yielding true services to represent
the behaviour of the agents with their subjective probabilities (and avoid St Petersburg
paradox), doesn't solve at all the problem of the tails of probability distributions because
the utility function also is badly known on extreme events.
On one hand the reasonings in quadratic mean are iteratively coherent and develop in
a whole rationality, on the other hand, procedures and arguments using thick probability
tails build a language which tends to deteriorate, what leads necessarily to methodological
and philosophical questions: given a family of probability distributions P on R, each P
possessing an expectation, if the real parameter  is random with law (d), it is possible




have no expectation. This is not related to the existence of an expectation for , but comes
only from the fact that an everywhere nite function may be non integrable. This has
been known for long time and concrete decisional consequences have been emphasized by
Mandelbrot in the 1970's (Mandelbrot 1970 and 1973) and more recently by Weitzman
(2007) in climate change models about variances what is similar. In other words, the
intersubjective rationality based on the least squares is fragile, when you leave it a little,
no return force leads you back to it.
To these remarks, we must add specic features related to the identication of models
by mean of statistical experiments1. Of course no histogram is able to yield the tails of the
distributions and this happens also, in the multivariate case, for estimating correlation in
any form of this notion (copulas, etc.). When the dimension is high, as usual in physical
or economical models for global change, to the preceding diculties comes in addition the
1Cf. K. Burdzy 2009 for dierent philosophies of probability theory and the question of the use of









































9famous phenomenon of the \curse of dimensionality" which makes identication much
more fuzzy2.
Let us mention also that the use of probability distributions on R or R+ to evaluate
probabilities of exceeding a threshold thanks to the extreme value theory is most often
a doubtful operation because the extreme value theorem yields a convergence in distri-
bution to a limit law which depends on the scale of the measurement device. Except for
very particular physical cases where the quantities to be measured are clearly additive,
the obtained thresholds have no intrinsic value and depends on the choice of a linear or
logarithmic scale for instance3 .
In order to tackle the methodological diculties related to the tails of probability
distributions, we will enlarge the problem and open new angles of attack.
II. Teachings drawn from the mathematical nance.
Finance developed since the 1970's several techniques of risk management, which are
interesting examples both to understand their eciency and to attempt to draw lessons
of their weakness as recently revealed by the subprime crisis. The amounts staked on
the markets are nite but not a priori bounded, and the problems of tails of distributions
occur for all models, either models of options pricing and hedging, for interest rate models,
or for assessing the exposure to risk of a nancial company.
Slightly after the development of the organized derivative markets (the 1970's in the
US, the 1980's in Europe and Japan), under the impulse of the bank JP Morgan, appeared
a simple principle in order to evaluate the exposure of a nancial organism: the \value at
risk" denoted V aR represents the maximal loss that is not exceeded with the probability p
(in general p = 95% or p = 99%) at a given date. The computation of V aR for an assets
portfolio or for a bank presents several diculties due especially to the restlessness of
the spot prices (mark to market) and the discounting renormalization of term products.
Practically, at present, in the banks and in most of the textbooks, V aR is computed
with the help of explicit probability distributions calibrated on reality by usual statistical
parametrical tests, hence hypotheses on tails of distributions are assumed. However, in
its philosophy, the criterion V aR doesn't involve at all the tail of the distribution and its
logic may be extended further by the following principle: to have a good knowledge of the
parameters when they are in some domain and to content oneself with an upperbound of
the probability of the exterior of the domain. We shall come back to this idea later on.
At present, the use of V aR is going to be supplanted by more sophisticated techniques.
2Actually, from a pragmatic point of view, in concrete cases where the tail is unknown, even the total
mass of the distribution may be indeterminate. Our measurement devices are not always designed to
distinguish accurately between very large and innite quantities. In other words, it may happen that we
hesitate about the possible presence of a mass at innity. This might be written as usual in the theory
of Markov processes when dealing with sub-Markov kernels.
3For other pecularities of this theorem see N. Bouleau \Splendeurs et mis eres des lois de valeurs









































9These new methods appeared to avoid a default of the criterion V aR. The criterion V aR
is not sudadditive in general. If V aR(X1) and V aR(X2) are the absolute values of the
maximal losses on the portfolios X1 and X2 at some given date and with some given
probability threshold, for the union of the two portfolios, where compensations may occur,
we would expect to have V aR(X1 +X2)  V ar(X1)+V ar(X2) but this inequality is not
fullled in general4.
In order to correct this default \coherent measures of risk" were proposed5. It is
possible to show that any risk criterion satisfying the common sense rules that are expected
when two portfolios are gathered or when a portfolios is multiplied by a deterministic
constant, (subadditivity C(X1 +X2)  C(X1)+C(X2); homogeneity C(X1) = C(X1);
monotony C(X1)  C(X2) if X1  X2; invariance by translation) are necessarily of the
form
m(L) = supfEP[L] j P 2 Pg (1)
where P is a set of probability laws, EP the expectation symbol under the probability P
and L the loss (i.e. the opposite of the value of the portfolio L =  X).
An interest of this result is to emphasize the importance of scenarios. The probability
distributions which govern nancial assets generally depend on the observer. The coherent
measures of risk suggest to consider several probabilistic hypotheses to perform the risk
analysis and to take eventually the most unfavorable estimate.
The mean loss above a threshold (expected shortfall), and all the coherent measures of
risk, because of the formula (1), need the knowledge of the whole probability distribution
of the loss, including the tail with its very rare events. They yield therefore numeri-
cal quantication criteria satisfying more harmonious logical principles but carrying the
congenital default of throwing mathematical writings on a partially or totally unknown
reality.
This leads us to deepen the reection on the over-mathematization of the nance today,
because this is the source of more general teachings. The recent crisis is the convergence
of several causes which are not our purpose to examine exhaustively. But it reveals
a fundamental point about risks and their mathematization. The above mentionned
techniques of risk quantization favored the organization of markets of credit risks, that
denotes the term of titrization. When insurance companies or banks have to manage risks
in their country or region and if these risks are independent from a region to another or
less correlated, they have advantage to exchange their risks. In order to install a market
of risks it is necessary that sellers and buyers be able to quantify their own risks and they
use for this the mathematization that we described above. The idea of organizing re-
insurance as a market whose participant are insurance companies and where the product
to be exchanged is the risk is an old \genious" idea studied by Maurice Allais and Kenneth
Arrow in the 1950's. It applies as well to banks for the management of all their risks6. In
Arrow's model, each participant has his own subjective probabilities. This extend to the
4Cf. e.g. R. Portait and P. Poncet, Finance de march e, Dalloz 2008, p. 901 et seq.
5Cf. Artzner, et al. 1997 and 1999; Delbaen 2000.
6Cf. K. Borch "Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market" Econometrica vol 30, n3, July 1962; and R.









































9case where everyone looks at several scenarios to evaluate his risk. Since agents do not have
the same measure of risk because they dont interpret the underlying reality to each asset
in the same way and because they have dierent risk aversion and utility functions hence
dierent behaviors in uncertainty, exchanges of risks against payment may be protable
for buyers and sellers. Prices may be computed thanks to mathematical models.
On such bases, credit risk markets have developed especially in the US these last
twenty years.
For the management of completely probabilized risks (known probability distribution
and known function of damages) the interest of risk markets are clear. It amounts not
to put all one's eggs in one basket. This would be the case for instance for the material
damages of trac car crashes. But most of risks possess a purely semantic and interpre-
tative component which is based on a reading of economy and which remains in every
case concerning the tails of distributions. For such risks, to place one's condence in the
common opinion { as done by putting the risks in market { is a logical mistake, since most
of participants go by a ready-made mathematization drawn from notation agencies, and
therefore do not bring anything to the lack of understanting of anyone. In other words,
putting the risks in market belongs to a rationality only for completely calibrated and
perfectly statistically known situations.
The probabilistic representation of risk (with objective probabilities or subjective prob-
abilities from the points of view of the agents) is classically a pair of mathematical quan-
tities, 1o a probability distribution which governs the state of nature that may happen,
2o a function which to each state gives a damage or a benet. For instance the height of
the river Loire at Orl eans follows some probability distribution, and to any given height
may be (theoretically) associated the cost of the possible ood.
However this representation by a pair of mathematical quantities is a too simple and
too ideal scheme of thinking.
- Too ideal because we are almost never in a situation where this model is well lled in.
We dont know the tails of the distributions because the data are lacking on rare events.
We ignore the correlations in order to estimate the damages and no complete description
of what may happen is available.
- But, above all, the model is simplistic because it is hiding the reasons why we
are interested to these events by doing as if they could be translated automatically and
objectively into costs.
The true goal of risk analysis is not to do computations but to progress with a little
more clear-sightedness in social facts and uses. It may be about the threat a child be run
over by a car when crossing the street, about the risk that the air of London poisons the
inhabitants, or that the bankruptcy of an rm induces other bankruptcies, etc.
The intellectual operation consisting in probabilizing a situation is fundamentally an
ousting, an erasing of the meaning. In the particular case of physics, it is the result of the
construction process of the knowledge on the laws of matter. But it is widely problematic
for all what concerns the human behavior. The risk analysis is necessarily understanding
of interpretations.









































9ignorance. As we dont know precisely to quantify neither the return risk of a loan, nor
the market or liquidity risk, nor the risks due to human mistakes or due to a regulation
change, very accurate computations are mixed with rough estimates hopping they will
have no sensitive consequences on the result. During the manufacturing of packages of
several credits, a standardization of the description occurs (reduced to the notations of
the agencies) which moves away from reality. At the limit, a mortgage loan in Iowa or
Kansas is thought in the same manner as a credit at New-York on Madison avenue if they
are both well assessed.
As the mathematical theory if far in advance before the available data, sophisticated
methods are applied to rough hypotheses whose coarseness is forgotten along the com-
putation. The bankruptcies of the banks or rms are represented by Poisson processes
whose parameter, the mean ow, is in fact unknown. It is a characteristic of coherent
measures of risk to involve the whole tail of the probability distribution. But the tails
are never known. Hence their use implies necessarily tacking a mathematical model on
an ignored reality.
It is the meaning of an event that makes the risk. Let us take an example, suppose
a particular type of cancer be enumerated within the population. This subset of the
suering people is the concrete event. The ratio to the whole population will be taken
for an estimate of the risk. If it would happen that observation and inquiry reveal that a
signicant part of the concerned persons have taken { say cannabis { twenty years before,
then all the cannabis consumers become potential patient. If another common property
of the sick persons is pointed out { e.g. they have used mobile phones as soon as these
were available { then almost the whole population is now threatened. The risk changes
when the interpretation modies the meaning of the event.
Reducing the risk to a probability distribution and a money amount rubs out the main
part of the diculties. It is to attach condence to the mathematization as approxima-
tion, as if the physical reality was concerned, but the question deals with meaning whose
subjectivity impregnates all the social relations of the agents. We are not in an approx-
imation process, as usual in applied mathematics with discretization or nite elements
methods. It is interpretation, hence meaning which is transformed into numbers.
We said that signicant improvements have recently been brought to these procedures
thanks to the coherent risk measures. But all these methods have the inborn inadequacy of
considering that the interpretating process is closed. Now on the contrary, instead of being
closed, it is in permanent innovation. As soon as a new reading appears, it generates new
risks which are only perceived by those ones who understand it. If in 2006, nobody sees
the increase of the real estate prices and the decrease of the households savings in the
US as a phenomenon allowing several readings, the corresponding risk is not detected.
The mathematization sweeps up these diculties thanks to hypotheses on the tails of the
distributions. It is not enough to say that they are badly known. They are, by nature,
temporary and uctuating depending on the interpretative knowledge that the agents
acquire by their understanding of economical phenomena.
This limitation of the relevant mathematization holds as well for the other risks due









































9In fact any advance in the knowledge makes us discover features of the world on which we
were not aware before and, by this, generate new risks. Whatever way is taken for math-
ematizing the risks, they are congealed, canned in a box which hides the interpretative.
It is compulsory, the weakness of mathematics is that they are formal !
III. Can we transpose these arguments to the economical models of global
change ?
Uncertainties are so numerous about CO2 future concentration that IPCC, in his
methodological recommendations to contributers, looks for a clear and well calibrated
language to speak on vague notions. Is it the right way? As things are taken, it is
doubtful7 .
First of all, we can think that it is possible to avoid any assumption on the tails of
the distributions, as with the criterion V aR, by reasonning inside a domain with explicit
boundary.
In a modelling framework, the frontiers are dened by specifying a domain to all the
quantities: to the data, to the parameters, and, thanks to the model to the computed
outputs. It is possible to write down a methodology BaR (Boundary at Risk) which
extends V aR, and consists for each quantity, say X, to dene a domain D and a threshold
7It is suggested 15 steps in order to take in account the desirable precautions from the beginning of the
work until its nal expression, evaluating the doubts, the ignorances, the uncertainties and the degrees
of condence which may be attached to each part of the discourse. Three categories of uncertainty
are distinguished: unpredictability, structural uncertainty, uncertainty on the numerical values. This
philosophy adopts the rule of claiming as few as possible and using mood auxiliaries watering down any
remarkable insight in order all what is interpretative desappears. For instance the degrees of condence
are splitted in ve levels: Quantitatively calibrated levels of condence
Terminology Degree of condence in being correct
Very High condence At least 9 about 10 chance of being correct
High condence About 8 out of 10 chance
Medium condence About 5 out of 10 chance
Low condence About 2 out of 10 chance
Very low condence Less than 1 out of 10 chance
This rather curious table shows how the care of well doing may leads to obscure nomenclatures: how is
it possible to have a low degree of condence in a model which has 2 out of 10 chances of being correct?
With 5 chances on 10 already, the model doesn't yield information any longer, lower it brings a thesis
about what will not happen. We see that the two discourses of the expert and of the model are confused.
The calibration proposed by the IPCC is a false rigour. It simply reduces to carefully evade any formal
criticism.
This point has been objected in the CIRED: \have we not to consider that a model correct one times
over ten yields an information? If it rains 1 day over 2, and if some model, correct one times on 10
predicts the rain, we can say that the probability of the rain is greater than 1/2." This objection shows
the diculty to keep clear ideas even among scientists about the meaning of words. For myself I argue
in the following way: if the model is correct 1 times on 10, it is wrong 9 times on 10, then if it says today
\rain", there are 9 chances on 10 that the sun shines. In the objection the expression \to be correct one









































9of probability p such that PfX = 2 Dg  p.
This way of thinking possesses the natural following coherence: if several situations
are considered depending on a parameter  and if
PfX = 2 D1g  p
for  in the domain D2, if  becomes random and if the probability that  be outside D2
is less than q, then for the resulting probability one has evidently:
Pf = 2 D2; X = 2 D1g  p + q:
The language BaR allows to improve a model by taking in account new aleas provided that
the new randomized parameters be managed in the same way. Therefore this language
doesn't have the defects explicited by Weitzman 2007.
More generally, it is easy to see that if two random quantities are considered X and
Y and if N(y;dx) is the conditional law of X given Y = y. If we know
i) the measure N(y;dx)1D1(x) when y is in D2
ii) the law of Y given the event Y 2 D2 i.e. the probability measure
1D2(y)PY (dy)
PY (D2)
then we know the joint law of the pair (X;Y ) given the event fX 2 D1g and fY 2 D2g.
Despite several interesting works related to this way of reasonning (cf. Petschel-Held
et al. 1999, Bruckner et al. 2003, Corfee-Morlot et al. 2003), this approach presents
necessarily the counterpart of its advantages : nothing is said in case of overcrossing the
boundary. In fact, with a suitable mathematical formalism, BaR may be seen as a spe-
cial case of VaR, so that it may be subject to the same citicism as VaR in particular to
give no information on what happens when the boundary is crossed. But the ultimate
goal of the models is to favor the emergence of an intersubjective truth in order that the
parties, inside their interest conict, may begin a constructive dialog. The philosophy of
Boundary at Risk can only be relevant if everyone hopes to remain in the studied domain
and acts for this at any cost. But the action of economic forces makes instead that ev-
eryone is oriented toward a progress of his energy consumption what leads straitforward
to the boundary. In other words communication rules are of the rst importance, as is
well known in matter of climate change, and this imposes that extreme events occuring
behind the boundary be described and discussed.
The logic of scenarios suggested by the \coherent measures of risk" is much more
promising. We nd here an approach which was already in practice among civil engineers.
Since it is actually impossible to explore all the branches of the tree of consequences leading
to the ruin of the structure, some a priori damagings are considered and the probability
of the scenarios leading to such damages is estimated. This logic of scenarios penetrates
more and more in every eld of the futurology, and especialy in the studies of the relations
between economic decisions and climate modications.
In the case of the damaging of a civil engineering structure, for security reasons the
engineer will choose the unfavorable envelope of all the considered scenarios. It is also









































9But in the case of economical models for the global change, it is rather the specic
appearence and the qualitative description of the consequences of each scenario which is
liable to interest the decision makers.
Of course these approaches have the defect which is the counterpart of their advan-
tages: they use tails of distributions which are badly known and hence may be criticized.
In addition, we must keep in mind that the main defect of the methods using tails of
distribution is not so much to propose an imperfect representation of the risks but rather
to let believe that the interpretative process is closed. But continuously the agent think
to improve their knowledge and forecastings, and for this re-interpret all the information
they capture.
This is well illustrated by the language used by the IPCC. If we read today the rst
report of 1990, the supplement of 1992 and the second report approved in December 1995,
we are necessarily amazed by the fact that the meaning of the tails of distribution changed.
They reected a high ignorance on physical phenomena so that a lot of accelerating eects
were unsuspected. They reect today much more the doubts about the behavior and the
political decisions.
Sometimes a distinction is done between the alea related to the (natural and social)
reality and that one related to our own ignorance which may be more or less \probabi-
lizable". The point is that generally the statistical methods do not allow to share clearly
between these two categories which in practice overlap. But is that really the problem?
In any way it is an ignorance about the plausibility of a phenomenon, the main point is
that we are interested by this phenomenon because it means something.
If we consider a very elaborate model of the type of IMAGE for instance and that
a lighter simulation is proposed which reveals new phenomena like the permafrost fer-
mentation, or the lubrication of the rock by the water under the glaciers, etc., all the
preceding formalization of the risk becomes lapsed because new signications appear. A
modelization is always an interpretation8. Already for natural phenomena it is impossible
to be exhaustive and new eects are always possible, but this is yet much more relevant
in the case of modelization of economic phenomena. The more physical phenomena of
climate change are better known the more we are closer to a similar situation to nance
where it is the interpretations and anticipations of the actors that we have to put into
the risks. The hope of tending to a \reality" thanks to a ner and ner mathematization
is an illusion because in mathematizing the economic risks one attempt truly to modelize
all the possible interpretations of a situation.
The investigation modelling has the ambition to reveal new signications.
In some sense, it is with respect to heavy mathematization what sociological enquiry
is with respect to statistical poll. Let us explicit this comparison. Econometricians
often criticize sociologists that they content themselves of polling about fty persons, an
unsucient sample of the population to deduce anything. On the contrary they construct
polls, as for them, statistically exploiting thousand or more questionnaires. But the
sociologist doesn't proceed with questionnaires, he lets people talk. What he is looking









































9for, when he investigates on daily transportation or on the use of water by the inhabitants
for instance, it is explanations to which he wouldn't have thought a priori, signicant
reasons which enlighten some behaviors and which he will use later on to deepen the
subject. The questionnaire encapsulates thought categories. That yields numbers, ratios,
but it is closed. It is not with its help that what is not yet imagined will be discovered.
Therefore investigation modelling possesses, from this point of view, a fundamental
justication. It is not a clumsy sketch of truly scientic models which run gigantic black
boxes. It has an essential epistemological role, that of regenerating the risks signication.
For that it can avoid the heavy, accurate and opaque quantitative which has the innate
aw of a hight intellectual inertia, it can remain light, movable following the aim of mak-
ing signicant phenomena appear.
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